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Blurring Lines: How Supplemental
Jurisdiction Unknowingly Gave the
World Ancillary Personal Jurisdiction
By ADAM HOFMANN*
MANY LAW REVIEW articles begin with a gripping story, a hook, to
grab the reader's attention and enflame their emotions. The idea is to
make the reader understand, from the beginning, why the article is
important by putting a human face, some real consequence, to the
legal issues that they are discussing. This Comment has no such grip-
ping story. It is aimed at a small group of attorneys who are litigating
or anticipate litigating an interpleader action. As a result, this Com-
ment seeks not to enflame emotions, but to engage in a very practical,
grounded dialogue to assist those attorneys.
An informal poll of practicing attorneys will likely uncover that
most have only a vague recollection of interpleader actions from their
first-year civil procedure class. A fairly esoteric procedural device, very
few attorneys have had to actually litigate an interpleader action. This
Comment focuses on a very specific and even more esoteric inquiry:
Can a district court hearing a statutory interpleader action subject an
interpleaded defendant to personal liability from a co-defendant's
cross-claim despite the fact that that defendant would not ordinarily
be amenable to suit in that court on a kind of "well, they're already
here" approach to personal jurisdiction? This Comment will conclude
that the answer should be no, although some courts appear to think
otherwise. And for those who are still with me, this is the gripping
story, the consequence of this Comment: federal courts are utilizing
an impermissibly lax, discretionary standard with regard to the rigid
strictures of personal jurisdiction.
Section 2361 of the interpleader statute' authorizes federal dis-
trict courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over interpleaded defend-
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ants via nationwide service of process. This Comment will provide
arguments for lawyers with clients over whom personal jurisdiction
has first been exercised for purposes of completely resolving the inter-
pleader action by virtue of section 2361 and who have been seconda-
rily subjected to personal jurisdiction, and placed in danger of
personal liability, in a factually related cross-claim by virtue of the mis-
leadingly named doctrine, "supplemental personal jurisdiction."
This Comment begins with an overview of the underlying con-
cepts in civil procedure. First, the Comment will provide a refresher in
interpleader actions, their nature, and their underlying raison d'etre.
Second, the Comment will introduce a relatively unknown doctrine in
the federal courts-supplemental personal jurisdiction 2-a doctrine
that grew out of, yet substantially expanded, the better known doc-
trine of supplemental subject matter jurisdiction. Next, Part II will
consider the underlying problem, the exercise of supplemental per-
sonal jurisdiction over cross-claims filed by co-defendants in inter-
pleader actions. As will be discussed, there are two primary
justifications courts have used to exercise personal jurisdiction in such
cases. Finally, Part III will argue why both justifications are inherently
flawed and why supplemental personal jurisdiction should not be up-
held by courts in interpleader actions.
I. Background
A. Statutory Interpleader Actions3
As noted, this Comment focuses on a fairly unusual type of fed-
eral action. Title 28, section 1335, of the United States Code creates
2. It is important to note here the definition of terms that will be used with some
apparent interchangeability. Supplemental jurisdiction, under the supplemental jurisdic-
tion statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2003), combined the two common law doctrines of pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction. Pendent jurisdiction gave a plaintiff the right to assert transac-
tionally related state and federal law claims in the same case. Ancillary jurisdiction, alterna-
tively, was a defendant's tool that allowed the district courts to hear a defendant's third
party claim under state law as ancillary to the transactionally related federal question claim
brought against her. See 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1444 n.41 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter 6 WRIGHT ET AL., SECOND EDITION]. Similarly, as will
be shown, by virtue of this statutory combination in the context of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the more limited doctrine of what was known as "pendent personal jurisdiction" was
expanded to include should be called "ancillary personal jurisdiction" under the inclusive
title "supplemental personal jurisdiction."
3. There is another type of federal interpleader, "rule interpleader," that derives
from Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Crv. P. 22. This type of
interpleader, however, is not within the scope of this jurisdictional concern because
nationwide service of process is only authorized in the case of statutory interpleader
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original jurisdiction in the district courts for actions filed "in the na-
ture of interpleader," wherein there is a contested fund held by the
filing party (the interpleader plaintiff) in excess of five hundred dol-
lars, and where the fund is subject to two or more adverse claims by
parties of diverse citizenship from one another (the claimant-defend-
ants).4 In other words, three requirements must be met before an in-
terpleader action may be brought in a district court. First, one party
must hold a "fund" exceeding a value of five hundred dollars. Second,
there must be two or more other individuals who claim a right, ad-
verse to one another's claims, to some or all of that fund. Finally, the
fund-holder, the plaintiff, rather than staking any remaining personal
claim to the fund, must place the fund in the keeping of the court and
force the putative claimants to litigate their respective rights to the
fund amongst each other in a single forum.
The primary motivation for the existence of this action is the in-
terests of the stakeholder.5 The stakeholder protects herself by ensur-
ing, through operation of res judicata, against multiple liability on
claims to the fund that might result if each putative claimant were to
litigate her own respective claim in a separate forum. Such multiple
litigation could lead to inconsistent results and, in turn, to multiple
liability exceeding the sum of the fund. To place this in a factual con-
text, imagine a car accident in which a single driver causes damage to
multiple vehicles. The driver's insurance company holds a limited
fund, that is, the liability limit on the driver's policy. The insurance
company should only be forced to pay an amount equal to, or less
than, that amount. However, if each owner of the damaged vehicles
were to litigate against the insurance company separately, the differ-
ent courts might each award a portion of that fund such that, taken
together, the awards could exceed the value of the policy. In recogniz-
ing that it will have to pay the entire sum of the policy, the insurance
company in an interpleader action can deposit the fund with a district
court and force the claimants to litigate their adverse claims amongst
each other in that single forum, ensuring consistent judgments and
precluding liability in excess of the policy limits.
actions and is not available in so-called "rule interpleader" actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2361
(2003).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2003).
5. 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1702 (3d ed.
2001) [hereinafter WRIGHT ET AL., THIRD EDITION].
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Nationwide service of process is authorized in statutory inter-
pleader actions. 6 Generally, federal courts may only exercise jurisdic-
tion over the person of defendants who would be subject to personal
jurisdiction in the courts of the state in which the district court sits. 7
However, the person of a defendant may also be subject to the juris-
diction of the court in interpleader cases and where a federal statute
authorizes. 8 These statutory authorizations are commonly known as
nationwide service of process. In interpleader actions, this nationwide
service of process furthers the goal of protecting the stakeholder from
multiple, inconsistent liabilities. If claimants could avoid being forced
to litigate their claim to the fund in the interpleader action by claim-
ing not to be subject to personal jurisdiction, and therefore not ame-
nable to suit, in the forum in which the action was brought, the
protection afforded the stakeholder would be minimal to non-exis-
tent.9 Consequently, the provision for nationwide service of process
ensures the protection of the stakeholder by ensuring that all claim-
ants will be amenable to process in the interpleader court and, as
such, will be bound by the findings of that court.
B. Supplemental Personal Jurisdiction
The true beginning of the doctrine of supplemental personal ju-
risdiction is, oddly, the leading case in pendent subject matter juris-
diction, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.10 Recall that the United States
Constitution"1 and congressional statutes grant federal courts subject
matter jurisdiction, that is, authorize federal courts to hear cases in-
volving so-called federal questions, suits arising out of the Constitu-
tion or federal laws,12 and so-called diversity cases, in which the parties
are residents of different states) 3 Nonetheless, federal courts have
long adjudicated state law claims that are factually related to federal
question claims under the equitable doctrine of pendent subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. Gibbs involved a suit against a trade-union for secon-
dary boycott and interference with employment and haulage
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2003).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k) (1) (A).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C)-(D).
9. Note that because statutory interpleader actions are directed at actions in which
the claimant-defendants are residents of different states, without nationwide service of pro-
cess, there would often be at least one defendant who would not be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the interpleader court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2003).
10. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2003).
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2003).
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contracts. 14 After a mining company awarded jobs to members of a
rival union, the United Mine Workers forcibly closed the mine and
committed various acts of actual and threatened violence against the
mine operators and members of the rival union. 1 5 As a consequence
of the United Mine Worker's actions, the plaintiff, Paul Gibbs, lost his
haulage contract with the mine in question and, allegedly, began los-
ing business with other mines in the area. 1 6 Gibbs sued the United
Mine Workers under both the Labor Management Relations Act 17 and
Tennessee contract law. 18 Because the court's jurisdiction over the
case was predicated on the federal law claim, the Supreme Court felt
that a threshold question to the determination of the state law claim
was properly before the district court.19 The Supreme Court fleshed
out the common law doctrine of pendent subject matter jurisdiction,
allowing district courts to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over
state law claims arising out of "a common nucleus of operative fact"
such that "without regard to their federal or state character . . . [the
plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding. '20 The Court relied on the congressionally expressed in-
terest in "entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent
with fairness to the parties" inherent in the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 1 holding that the doctrine's 'justification
lies in considerations ofjudicial economy, convenience and fairness to
litigants." 22 In Gibbs, the Supreme Court dealt exclusively with the con-
stitutional power of the federal courts to hear pendent state law claims
and did not address personal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this justifica-
tion for the doctrine has led the circuit courts faced with this issue to
conclude that the same rationale applies to the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. 23
By way of introduction, the doctrine of supplemental personal
jurisdiction simply stated is that "where a federal statute authorizes
nationwide service of process, and the federal and state claims derive
from a common nucleus of operative fact, the district court may assert
14. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 720.
15. Id. at 718-19.
16. Id. at 720.
17. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1947).
18. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 717-18.
19. Id. at 721.
20. Id. at 725.
21. Id. at 724.
22. Id. at 726.
23. See Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555-56 (3d Cir. 1973).
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personal jurisdiction over the parties to the related state law claims
even if personal jurisdiction is not otherwise available." 24 It is impor-
tant to note that there is neither a federal statute nor a Supreme
Court decision expressly authorizing the exercise of supplemental
personal jurisdiction. There have been suggestions that the entire
doctrine is flawed, 25 but for the purposes of intelligible and limited
discussion, this Comment will accept the approval of the Second,
Third, Fourth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeal, each of which has
upheld the doctrine, and will operate under the assumption that, as
applied to strictly to "pendent claims," the doctrine is viable.
The earliest appellate court to affirmatively expand on the Gibbs
principles and exercise pendent personal jurisdiction was the Third
Circuit in Robinson v. Penn Central Co.2 6 In Robinson, the court held
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over state claims arising from
the same transaction giving rise to a Securities and Exchange Act
claim (authorizing extra-territorial service of process) was within the
court's discretion.2 7 The court started with dicta from Schwartz v. Ea-
ton,28 wherein the Second Circuit, though dismissing an appeal as in-
terlocutory, nevertheless stated that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant from service of process authorized
under the Investment Company Act would have been proper over
pendent state law claims. 29 The court reasoned that the statute had
already authorized the district court to "extend their writ extra-territo-
rially" and, since the defendant was properly before the court for pur-
poses ofjudgment, it mattered little how he got there.30 The Robinson
court reasoned further that, from this perspective, the question was
not one of in personam jurisdiction, but simply a matter of applying
pendent subject matter jurisdiction to the transactionally related state
claims.31 Following United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, the court held that it
should look to "considerations of judicial economy, convenience and
24. Iron Workers Local No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 796, 805
(N.D. Ohio 1998).
25. See Jason A. Yonan, An End to Judicial Overreaching in Nationwide Service of Process
Cases: Statutory Authorization to Bring Supplemental Personal Jurisdiction Within Federal Courts'
Powers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 557.
26. See Robinson, 484 F.2d at 553.
27. Id. at 555-56.
28. 264 F.2d 195, 197-98 (1959).
29. See Robinson, 484 F.2d at 555.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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fairness to litigants" and exercise its discretionary authority to hear the
state law claims. 32
The next major decision authorizing the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction over a defendant on the basis of pendent jurisdiction was
Oetker v. Werke.3 3 In Oetker, the court stated that the plaintiff could
rightly exercise personal jurisdiction by virtue of nationwide service of
process authorized by federal patent law. This enabled the plaintiff to
obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant with regard to all claims
arising out of the same core of operative facts.34 The court based this
holding first and foremost on the Gibbs decision and then cited, with-
out further comment, to a list of prior decisions approving the exer-
cise of pendent personal jurisdiction, beginning with the Robinson
case and followed by several lower court decisions, as well as the ap-
proval of legal scholars. 35
Before analyzing more recent cases on the subject, it is important
to discuss the codification of pendent (and ancillary) subject matter
jurisdiction in the so-called "supplemental jurisdiction statute. '3 6 The
statute authorizes a district court with original jurisdiction over a
claim, unless that jurisdiction arises from diversity, to exercise "supple-
mental jurisdiction" over all other claims that form the same "case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. '" 37
That authorization maintains the common law discretion of the courts
to deny jurisdiction under equitable principles such as the complexity
of a state law question or the predominance of the state law claim over
the federal claim.33 Section 1367 essentially codifies the common law
doctrines of pendent and ancillary personal jurisdiction into the uni-
fied "supplemental jurisdiction. '39 Pendent jurisdiction, as already
noted, gives the plaintiff the right to assert transactionally related state
law claims in the same case. Alternatively, ancillary jurisdiction is a
defendant's tool that allows the district courts to hear a defendant's
state law-based third party claim in the original action.40 While Con-
gress was comfortable combining these two doctrines in the subject
32. Id. at 555-56.
33. 556 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
34. Id. at 4.
35. Id. at 4-5.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2003).
37. Id. § 1367(a).
38. See id. § 1367(c).
39. See, e.g., Cami Rae Baker, The Codification of Pendent and Ancillay Jurisdiction: Supple-
mental Jurisdiction, 27 TULSA L.J. 247 (1991).
40. 6 WRIGHT ET AL., SECOND EDITION, supra note 2, § 1444.
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matter context, as we shall see, despite several district courts' tempta-
tions to do so, the concepts of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction do
not mix quite so comfortably in the context of personal jurisdiction.
Returning to the development of pendent personal jurisdiction,
further decisions have been largely without comment or further illu-
mination. In IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann,'4 1 the Second Cir-
cuit, relying largely on the rationale of Gibbs, its progeny, and the
aforementioned pendent personal jurisdiction authorities, held that
where a federal statute has authorized nationwide service of process
and where the federal and state law claims derive from a "common
nucleus of operative fact," a district court may assert personal jurisdic-
tion over the parties to the related state law claims "even if personal
jurisdiction is not otherwise available." 42 It is worth noting that this
decision, and those that precede it, arose out of the doctrine of pen-
dent jurisdiction as authorized by the Supreme Court in Gibbs. The
Herrmann court specifically discusses this source as the governing stan-
dard, as opposed to the supplemental jurisdiction statute,43 because
the statute had not yet come into force when the Herrmann action
began.44 The Second Circuit, however, sets up the reliance of lower
courts on the supplemental jurisdiction statute through dicta stating,
"In any event, an analysis under section 1367(a) would not alter our
analysis.'45
Following suit, in ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc.,46 the Fourth
Circuit expressly approved the exercise of pendent personal jurisdic-
tion, citing the aforementioned authorities and stating that, "[i] n rec-
ognizing pendent personal jurisdiction, we join the other circuits that
have done so." 47 The Fourth Circuit also appears to rely primarily on
Gibbs, but impliedly adds to the appearance of section 1367 authoriza-
tion (begun by the Second Circuit) by following its discussion of Gibbs
with the statement, "The [pendent jurisdiction] doctrine has since
been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367."48 This statement appears to indi-
cate that justifications based on Gibbs were equally supported by sec-
tion 1367. Finally, numerous district courts have begun to exercise
pendent personal jurisdiction on the basis of section 1367, referring
41. 9 F.3d 1049 (2d Cir. 1993).
42. Id. at 1056.
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
44. See Hermann, 9 F.3d at 1052 n.2.
45. Id. at 1052.
46. 126 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 1997).
47. Id. at 628.
48. Id.
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to it as "supplemental personal jurisdiction. '49 It is important to em-
phasize this apparent connection between pendent personal jurisdic-
tion and section 1367 because, as will soon become clear, this
connection drawn by the Second and Fourth Circuits led lower courts
to apply supplemental personal jurisdiction to cross-claims in statutory
interpleader cases.
II. District Courts Extend Supplemental Personal Jurisdiction
to Cross-Claim Defendants in Statutory Interpleader
There are presently only two applications of ancillary personal
jurisdiction;50 namely, statutory interpleader and bankruptcy actions.
This Comment will not address the application of ancillary personal
jurisdiction in bankruptcy actions because there appears to be statu-
tory authority for exercising ancillary personal jurisdiction in bank-
ruptcy cases. 51 Because this Comment deals with the narrow question
of ancillary personal jurisdiction in interpleader actions, and because
that exercise is not expressly authorized by statute, discussion of juris-
diction in bankruptcy cases, where it is expressly authorized, is largely
irrelevant. It may, however, be worth briefly noting this express au-
thorization. It is clear that Congress is capable of authorizing courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over parties for whom nationwide ser-
vice of process is authorized to force potential plaintiffs to litigate
their claims in one court. As a result, it may be appropriate to assume
that Congress's failure to authorize ancillary personal jurisdiction in
section 2361 indicates their intent that such jurisdiction not be
authorized.
There are currently three cases upholding the exercise of ancil-
lary or supplemental personal jurisdiction in *cross-claims by claimant-
defendants in statutory interpleader cases. 52 First, in First Tennessee Na-
49. See, e.g., Tucker v. Bank One, N.A., 265 F. Supp. 2d 923 (N.D. 111. 2003).
50. 1 employ the term "ancillary" here, as opposed to supplemental, to maintain the
distinction that has been glossed over by the lower courts between pendent personal juris-
diction and ancillary personal jurisdiction, though both are often now referred to as sup-
plemental jurisdiction. The reader will recall that "ancillary jurisdiction" is exercised over
the cross-claims by nominal defendants.
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334; Harder v. Desert Breezes Master Ass'n., 192 B.R. 47, 51
(N.D.N.Y. 1996).
52. An earlier case, Bank of Neosho v. Colcord, 8 F.R.D. 621 (W.D. Mo. 1949), is in
conflict with the other earlier cases to be discussed infra. In effect it exercised supplemen-
tal personal jurisdiction, but it is distinguishable from the present issue in two ways. First,
that case dealt with rule interpleader, which does not authorize nationwide service of pro-
cess. Id. at 622. Second, it appears that the cross-claimant defendant submitted voluntarily
to the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate its claim to the fund in question. Id. at 624.
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tional Bank, Chattanooga v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,53 the Eastern
District Court of Tennessee heard a statutory interpleader case
brought by First Tennessee National Bank, Chattanooga in order to
determine the ownership of certificates of deposit as between three
individuals and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")
acting as bankruptcy trustee for Hamilton Mortgage Company, Inc.
The individual defendants and the FDIC agreed that the certificates
were being held as security on a loan to the defendants. 54 The defend-
ants alleged that Hamilton failed to meet certain conditions prece-
dent to create an effective security interest in the certificates and,
further, failed to disburse the funds of the loan.55 The FDIC alleged
that the defendants defaulted on their loan and, therefore, that the
certificates belonged to the FDIC, acting as trustee for Hamilton. In
addition, the FDIC filed a cross-claim for the balance of the loan.56
The individual defendants, Atlanta residents, were brought before the
court under statutorily authorized service of process under section
2361 and, according to the court, should therefore be "subject to the
jurisdiction of this Court only insofar as necessary to decide the ques-
tion of entitlement to the interpleaded certificates. '' 57 The court then
embarked on a thorough consideration of the question of whether or
not application of supplemental personal jurisdiction was appropriate
to claims such as the one brought by the FDIC. The court began its
careful analysis by examining the still open question (a question that
remains open to this day) of whether an interpleader action is one in
personam or in rem. 58 The court first determined that, based on pre-
That is substantially different from a party who is brought before the court on nationwide
service of process. If allowed to exercise ancillary personal jurisdiction over a party upon
nationwide service of process, the defendant could not, upon refusing to appear before the
adjudicating court, later contest the court's jurisdiction to render a verdict against him on
traditional jurisdictional grounds as he could under rule interpleader. See FED. R. Cxv. P.
60; Prete v. Lepore, 125 F.R.D. 572 (D. Conn. 1989) (denying Rule 60(b) (4) motion to
vacate defaultjudgment as void where statute authorized nationwide service of proess.); see
also Robinson Eng'g Co. Pension Plan & Trust v. George, 223 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2000)
(denying Rule 60(b) (4) motion on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction where statute
authorized nationwide service of process on defendant; remanded for determination of
adequacy of service).
53. 421 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
54. Id. at 36.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 37.
57. Id.
58. Id. Generally, a court exercises in personam jurisdiction over a party when ajudg-
ment sought will lie against the individual, that is, where the judgment will result in per-
sonal liability against an individual. Alternatively, a court exercises in rem jurisdiction
when the judgment lies only with regard to a "res," a piece of property. For more on the
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cedent and commentary, the question of whether the action is in rem
or in personam is irrelevant in the context of interpleader; only the
requirements of due process need to be satisfied in order for jurisdic-
tion to be proper..5 9 The court then adopted the "sensible approach"
found in the commentaries of Wright and Miller's Federal Practice
and Procedure and of Harvard Law Professor, Zechariah Chaffee. 60
These commentators rely on Rule 13 (g),6i allowing the liberal asser-
tion of transactionally related cross-claims against co-parties. Rule 2262
mandates that all interpleader actions be conducted according to the
Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 13 (g). As a result, they argue
that parties are entitled to assert "cross-claim [s] .. .against a co-party
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
either of the original action ... or relating to any property that is the
subject matter of the original action. ' 63 Further, they argue that, be-
cause any cross-claims may be asserted arising out of either the same
transaction or property that forms the subject matter of the case,
there is no need for an answer as to the in personam-in rem ques-
tion. 64 In addition, they suggest that this rule indicates congressional
approval of the broadening of litigation in the interest of judicial
economy.65
The next court to consider the issue of supplemental personal
jurisdiction was the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York. In Priority Records, Inc. v. Bridgeport Music Inc.,6 6 the
court exercised what it referred to as ancillary personal jurisdiction
over cross-claims. 6 7 The plaintiff entered a fund with the court made
up of royalties from a catalog of songs by the composer, funk legend
George Clinton. 68 The cross-claims were filed by one California re-
cord company against another, claiming a right not only to royalties
from the catalog held by Priority Records (the interpleader "fund"),
question of in rem and in personam jurisdiction in interpleader actions, see Donald L.
Doernberg, What's Wrong with This Picture?: Rule Interpleader, the Anti-Injunction Act, In Per-
sonam Jurisdiction, and MC. Escher, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 551, 574 (1996).
59. See First Tenn. Nat'l Bank, 421 F. Supp. at 37-38.
60. Id.
61. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
62. See FED. R. Civ. P. 22(1).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
64. See First Tenn. iVat'l Bank, 421 F. Supp. at 38 (citing WRIGHT ET AL., THIRD EDITION,
supra note 5, § 1711).
65. Id.
66. 907 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
67. Id. at 732.
68. Id. at 729.
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but to the complete- listing of Clinton's work.69 The court exercised
ancillary jurisdiction generally, including personal jurisdiction, in con-
sideration of the judicial economy of concluding the matter in one
proceeding, as weighed against the relatively low inconvenience to the
other claimant-defendant who was already properly before the court
under the interpleader statute's nationwide service of process. 7°1 The
district court did not avail itself of the careful consideration under-
taken by the Tennessee court in the former discussion. Instead, it re-
lied on the aforementioned approval of commentators calling for a
"'sensitive and flexible approach"' to this subject in the interest of
judicial economy. 71
The Court for the Southern District of New York more recently
revisited this subject in Rubinbaum, LLP v. Related Corporate Partners V.72
The district court in this case exercised what it now referred to as
"supplemental personal jurisdiction" over claimant-defendants, the
Brannons, on theories of breach of fiduciary duties, breach of con-
tract, accounting, and declaratory judgments over their alleged failure
to see a real estate project through appropriately.73 The Brannons
were claimants to an interpleaded fund composed of the escrow fund
for a development property.74 The court expressly predicated jurisdic-
tion on the combination of the Second Circuit's recent decision in
Herrmann and the latter enacted supplemental jurisdiction statute. 75
The court referred to the dictum in Herrmann, to the effect that analy-
sis under section 1367 would not alter their analysis, and concluded
that the statute and prior decisions, including Priority Records, author-
ized the exercise of supplemental personal jurisdiction generally. 76
The court went on to acknowledge that most applications of supple-
mental personal jurisdiction had been with regard to pendent juris-
diction arising from other statutes, but stated that "[t] here is nothing
about the interpleader statute that would preclude the application of
supplemental personal jurisdiction in statutory interpleader ac-
tions. '77 As in Priority Records, the court's analysis concentrated on the
desirability of adjudicating claims in one action and the relatively low
69. Id. at 730-31.
70. Id. at 731.
71. Id. at 729. (quoting WRIGHT ET AL., THIRD EDITION, supra note 5, § 1715).
72. 154 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
73. Id. at 483, 488.
74. Id. at 484.
75. Id. at 488.
76. Id. at 489-90.
77. Id. at 490.
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inconvenience to the Brannons, who were already properly before the
court.
78
Admittedly, thus far, the issue of supplemental personal jurisdic-
tion in statutory interpleader actions has arisen in only a few pub-
lished cases. Nonetheless, it is important to note the approval of
commentators and the courts' heavy reliance thereon as ajustification
for their exercise of jurisdiction when the issue has arisen. 79 This is
addressed in order to draw attention to the likelihood that when this
admittedly rare and fairly esoteric issue arises again, based on the re-
cent precedents and scholarly approval, courts are likely to continue
down this flawed road.
III. Arguments Against the Exercise of Supplemental
Personal Jurisdiction in Statutory
Interpleader Actions
It is important to understand the justifications that have been em-
ployed in explaining this expansion of supplemental personal jurisdic-
tion to cross-claims in statutory interpleader actions. As noted, courts
and scholars have principally relied on two justifications for this
expansion.
First, they have relied on the perceived extension of pendent per-
sonal jurisdiction into supplemental personal jurisdiction, through
the supplemental jurisdiction statute, thereby extending pendent per-
sonal jurisdiction to what was once known as ancillary personal juris-
diction. The problem with this rationale is that the dominant
considerations in pendent personal jurisdiction are not necessarily the
dominant considerations in statutory interpleader. The essential dif-
ference rests on the distinction between a party sued for personal lia-
bility, a defendant in the usual sense, and a "claimant" interpleaded,
that is, an individual forced to litigate his claim against the inter-
pleader fund, a plaintiff in the usual sense. This is bolstered by the
statutory authorization for nationwide service of process, as well as the
nature of interpleader actions as different from almost all other types
of actions.
78. Id. at 489-490.
79. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., THIRD EDITION, supra note 5, § 1715, at 643. ("Certainly
nothing in [the interpleader statute] prohibits employing what in effect is a notion of
ancillary personal jurisdiction."); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Broadening the Second Stage of Federal
Interpleader, 56 HARV. L. REv. 929, 938 (1943).
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Second, courts have based this extension on an interpretation of
Rule 13(g), supported by many commentators, that the rule80 should
be interpreted broadly as creating personal jurisdiction where conve-
nience, judicial economy, and fairness to the litigants requires it. Rule
13(g) unquestionably governs interpleader actions. However, the
problem with this justification is that Rule 13(g) is not a rule of juris-
diction-it is a rule ofjoinder of claims. This is clear from the face of
the statute and from the limitations on its scope generally. This has
also been noted by the Ninth Circuit in a now largely lost opinion 8 1-
Rule 13 is a rule governing the conduct of civil actions, not creating
personal jurisdiction.
A. Faulty Reliance Upon Supplemental Personal Jurisdiction
The first difficulty in applying supplemental personal jurisdic-
tion, as the District Court for the Southern District of New York has
done by relying on what is actually pendent personal jurisdiction pre-
cedent, is that the exercise of what is really ancillary personal jurisdic-
tion is different than the exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction.
The problem is that, as suggested earlier, courts have assumed that
the analysis of pendent personal jurisdiction doesn't change under
the lately adopted supplemental jurisdiction statute. This assumption,
however, blurs an important distinction between pendent and ancil-
lary jurisdiction in the context of personal jurisdiction.
As noted earlier, the first court to apply what later became known
as pendent personal jurisdiction, Robinson, did not consider the ques-
tion as one of personal jurisdiction.8 2 Because the defendant in the
case was already present before the court, the court made the deci-
sion, based on Gibbs, to extend the subject matter of the case to the
transactionally related state claims.83 This approach highlights the dif-
ference between pendent jurisdiction and ancillary personal jurisdic-
tion. The defendant in Robinson was brought before the court by
nationwide service of process where he could be subjected to personal
liability. The court merely extended the defendant's exposure to per-
sonal liability to related state law claims, something clearly envisioned
by Gibbs. Alternatively, the claimant-defendant in an interpleader ac-
80. FED. R. Clv. P. 22(2) (stating that actions under section 1335 shall be conducted
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
81. See Hagan v. Central Ave. Dairy, 180 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1950).
82. But cf Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555 (3d Cir. 1973) ("The issue is
not one of territorial in personam jurisdiction-that has already been answered by [the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934]-but of subject-matter jurisdiction.").
83. Id.
[Vol. 38
INTERPLEADER ACTIONS
tion is not a defendant in the classic sense (that is, one who has alleg-
edly violated a law to the detriment of another and who is subjected to
personal liability for that detriment) but is a perceived potential plain-
tiff in an action that will, because of the unilateral act of the plaintiff
stakeholder, never happen. Thus, the claimant-defendant is exposed
to no personal liability by the court's exercise of nationwide service of
process.
Take the classic example of an interpleader action: a mass tort
wherein the tortfeasor is the holder of an indemnity insurance policy.
In such a case, the insurance company places the fund-here, the to-
tal value of the policy-into the court and forces the victims of the
tort, or the potential claimants perceived by the insurance company,
to stake their claim to that fund in one action. In this sense, the insur-
ance company is not suing the defendants for some legally stipulated
wrong done to them, but rather effectively forcing those parties to sue
them in one place and at one time. Alternatively, once a co-defendant
is permitted to assert a cross-claim against the claimant-defendant,
that claimant ceases to be merely a putative plaintiff and becomes a
defendant in the usual sense; she is forced to defend against claims
for personal liability. This is really the first time that the court extends
its jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because it is the first
time that the defendant is exposed to personal liability and will be
compelled to defend a claim against her. In a very real sense, a new
party has been brought before the court. Before the cross-claim, the
court exercised jurisdiction over a claimant. After the cross-claim, the
court exercises jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, subjecting
her to personal liability. This is more than merely adding subject mat-
ter to the case, as in Robinson and as envisioned by Gibbs. This changes
the very nature of the claimant's involvement with the action.
Some additional light may be shed on this gut-level understand-
ing of the "claimant-defendant" by looking at the language of the au-
thorization of service of process as compared with other statutes
authorizing nationwide service of process. While other examples ex-
ist,84 the primary applications of pendent personal jurisdiction by the
appellate courts above have revolved around nationwide service of
process authorized by the Securities Exchange Act of 193485 and the
84. See, e.g., 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1069.7 n.9 (3d ed. 2002).
85. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at tit.15, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2003).
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")86 As
will become clear, these statutes authorize nationwide service of pro-
cess on "defendants"'8 7 or "persons,"88 whereas section 1367 authorizes
service on "claimants." While this may appear merely semantic, the
distinction goes to the heart of the difference between interpleader
and almost all other types of actions.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes nationwide ser-
vice of process.89 The statute specifies that
[a]ny suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this
chapter or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any viola-
tion of such chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in
any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found
or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases
may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an
inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found. 90
First, it is important to note the language "in such cases," for it is
only "in such cases" that nationwide service of process is authorized.
The cases to which that language refers are "[a]ny suit or action to
enforce any liability or duty . . . or to enjoin any violation" of this
chapter, rules, or regulations.9 1 This language is comparatively broad
in scope and says nothing more about the nature of the proceeding
except that it seeks to enforce the rules of the Act. In fact, this broad
notion of what constitutes a "case" is the original basis for pendent
jurisdiction. The whole notion arose from the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of what constitutes a "case" under Article III, section 2.92
Second, notice that the language of the statute authorizes service on
"defendants." "Defendants" in this context can only mean parties sued
or subjected to personal liability in "such cases." That is, parties sub-
ject to a suit or action to enforce the rules of the Act. Service, there-
fore, is authorized as against actual or potential violators of the Act
"wherever they may be found." 3
In RICO actions, 18 U.S.C. section 1965(d) authorizes that "pro-
cess in any action or proceeding under this chapter may be served on
86. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act at tit. 16, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1965(d) (2000).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (stating that pendent
jurisdiction exists when claims are so related to comprise "but one constitutional 'case'").
93. See id.
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any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is
found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs."94 Note again how the
statute employs the broad language of "any action or proceeding" and
further note that the statute authorizes service on "any person."
The import of both of these statutes is that they authorize, by
their language, service of process for actions enforcing the rules of the
acts of which they are a part and that they authorize service on the
individuals who have broken those rules. In other words, both statutes
authorize courts to subject defendants to personal liability in a foreign
court.
Compare this with the nationwide service of process for statutory
interpleader.95 The statute states, "In any civil action of interpleader
or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335 of this title, a dis-
trict court may issue its process for all claimants .... ,,96 First, the
language "[i] n any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of in-
terpleader" is considerably more limited than the aforementioned ex-
amples. Service of process has been authorized for interpleader
actions, not "any action" to enforce rights or duties under statutory
rules. Second, the language authorizes "process for all claimants." As
noted above, the claimant-defendant is not a defendant at all-that is,
not a person who is subjected to personal liability by the plaintiff. In-
stead, the defendant is a possible plaintiff against the fund holder.
Hence, the statute authorizes service of process on "claimants" and
not on "persons" or "defendants." It is only the individual's claim to
the fund that is to be forcibly subjected to the jurisdiction of the court
because this is the only issue the plaintiff stakeholder has any interest
in resolving. The purpose of the interpleader statute and its nation-
wide service of process is to allow otherwise disinterested stakeholders
to avoid multiplicity of liability. In addition, the language of the stat-
ute is tailored in such a way as to indicate this limited purpose. There-
fore, it follows naturally that the individuals brought before a foreign
court, a court in which they would not otherwise be subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction, can only be brought as claimants and cannot be
subject to personal liability. 97 The combination of ancillary and pen-
dent jurisdiction into supplemental jurisdiction in the subject matter
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) (2000).
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2000).
96. Id.
97. Although a basic understanding of the limitations placed on a court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction by the Fourteenth Amendment is presumed, it may be worth re-
minding the reader that it is a violation of due process to subject an individual to personal
liability in a court in a forum state with which they do not have purposeful minimum
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context has buried this personal liability distinction between the two
in the personal jurisdiction context. This has allowed courts to apply
the reasoning that justified pendent personal jurisdiction to cases of
ancillary personal jurisdiction without really considering whether or
not the same justifications are in fact applicable.
Courts adopted this view in a now forgotten line of cases begin-
ning with Stitzel-WellerDistillery, Inc. v. Norman.98 The District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky in this early case dealt with an as-
serted cross-claim in the nature of tort by one claimant-defendant to a
fund of warehouse receipts held by the plaintiff over alleged fraud
with regard to the sale of those receipts.99 The defendants in the
cross-claims, residents of Ohio and Florida, were served with process
subject to the predecessor of section 2361100 in order to bring them
before the interpleader court in Kentucky and then served with notice
of the cross-claim against them. The Kentucky court determined that
the statute "does not confer jurisdiction over defendants in another
state against whom a personal judgment is sought by cross-bill filed by
a codefendant. Such a proceeding is not an interpleader proceeding,
and in such a proceeding the cross-defendants are not 'claimants' as
provided by the statute."''1 1 This case was followed by a short line of
cases102 and distinguished in others'03 but, regardless, has been
largely left behind in contemporary cases.' 0 4 Modern cases have
viewed the subsequent development of supplemental personal juris-
diction as superceding this line of cases.' 0 5 Thus, modern courts, in
their rush to grant themselves jurisdiction, have assumed that a doc-
trine governing one type of action is applicable to another. Further, in
that rush, courts have rejected soundly reasoned precedents that ex-
plained the inherent problem of ancillary personal jurisdiction on the
contacts. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978).
98. 39 F. Supp. 182 (W.D. Ky. 1941).
99. See id. at 184-85.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 41(26) (1936).
101. See, e.g., Stitzel-Weller, 39 F. Supp. at 188.
102. See, e.g., Hagan v. Central Ave. Dairy, 180 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1950).
103. See, e.g., Bank of Neosho v. Colcord, 8 F.R.D. 621, 624 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
104. But see Carolina Casualty Ins. Co. v. Mares, 826 F. Supp. 149, 154 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(holding that because nationwide service of process is only authorized for actions "of inter-
pleader or in the nature of interpleader," and cross-claims between claimant-defendants
going beyond the scope of the interpleaded fund were not in the nature of interpleader,
the exercise of jurisdiction over the person of a claimant-defendant for such cross-claims
would be an abuse of the interpleader statute).
105. See Rubinbaum LLP v. Related Corporate Partners V, L.P., 154 F. Supp. 2d 481,
490 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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sole grounds that the explanation came before the latter development
of the doctrine. That justification is, as has been illustrated, not so
easily applicable.
B. The Faulty Expansion of Rule 13 (g) and the Court's Equitable
Powers
Another approach to justifying the extension of supplemental
personal jurisdiction in interpleader cases has been reliance upon
Rule 13 (g) and commentators who have called for a "flexible ap-
proach" under the broad interpretation called for by Rule 13. This
flexible approach leads courts to the conclusion that, under discre-
tionary principles generally applied to supplemental subject matter ju-
risdiction, courts have similar authority to extend personal
jurisdiction to ancillary claims. Careful analysis of a now lost line of
cases will show the inherent faultiness in extending personal jurisdic-
tion on the basis of considerations of 'judicial economy and fairness
to the parties."
Rule 13(g) states:
A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against
a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim
therein or relating to any property that is the subject matter of the
original action. 10 6
Thus, Rule 13 (g) allows courts to liberally entertain transaction-
ally related cross-claims amongst co-parties in the interest of resolving
the entire controversy without requiring multiple suits. 10 7 First, it is
worth noting that, by its language, this is a rule of pleading, not one of
jurisdiction. The reader will notice that the rule says nothing about
jurisdiction. One might wonder if jurisdiction is, nonetheless, some-
how implicit. Clearly, however, this is not the case. Because Rule 13(g)
requires that cross-claims arise out of the "same transaction or occur-
rence,"10 8 they "are subject to basically the same transactional test."10 9
Therefore, courts have generally held that Rule 13(g) cross-claims
"fall within the ancillary jurisdiction of the court."' 10 This is not, how-
ever, the rule in all courts. 1 ' Even though the rule appears to require
the same transactional relation that section 1367 requires for the exer-
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
107. See 6 WRIGHT ET AL., SECOND EDITION, supra note 2, § 1431.
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
109. 6 WRIGHT ET AL., SECOND EDITION, supra note 2, § 1433.
110. See id.
111. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (g).
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cise of supplemental jurisdiction, the rule, by itself, does not actually
confer jurisdiction. If the statute cannot imply subject matter jurisdic-
tion, how can it imply personal jurisdiction? The rule certainly says
nothing about personal jurisdiction, nor does it require purposeful
minimum contacts as personal jurisdiction requires. 12 If the rule can-
not confer subject matter jurisdiction where its own requirements are
the same as those of section 1367, how can it confer personal jurisdic-
tion where its requirements do not even approach the rigorous re-
quirements imposed by due process? In addition, statutes authorizing
nationwide service of process also fail to mention purposeful mini-
mum contacts. Rule 13 (g), however, is different from those statutes in
that it is clear that it in no way authorizes the compulsion of appear-
ance by an individual before the court by nationwide service of pro-
cess. Rather, the rule limits its application to the assertion of cross-
claims by "co-parties," other defendants already properly before the
court." 3 Clearly then, Congress intended Rule 13(g) to apply only
when an individual was already a party, that is, already properly before
the court.
Even Wright and Miller recognize that Rule 13 (g) cannot be used
as a grounds for personal jurisdiction.
Since Rule 13 (g) specifically provides that cross-claims may be as-
serted only against co-parties, there typically can be no objection to
the court's jurisdiction over the person of the cross-claim defen-
dant; he is already before the court for the purposes of defending
against the main claim. However, if this is not the case, then any
personal jurisdiction objections remain available. 11 4
Wright and Miller are amongst those commentators cited as call-
ing for a flexible approach under Rule 13(g) in the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction in statutory interpleader litigation. 1 5 Consistent
with that argument, they go on to state that "if [the] defendant [in an
interpleader action] appears and asserts a right to the fund . . .his
appearance waives any objection to personal jurisdiction."' 1 6 But no-
tice that the claimant-defendant has not appeared, in the commenta-
112. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2000).
113. A defendant who wishes to assert a cross-claim against a party who is not already
before the court must resort to the procedure of FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a), but even Rule 14(a)
is limited by territorial rules of personal jurisdiction. 6 WRIGHT ET AL., SECOND EDITION,
supra note 2, § 1455 ("Requirements of personal jurisdiction and service of process must be
satisfied, which means that objections on these grounds are not defeated by the ancillary
nature of the proceeding.").
114. 6 "'RIGHT ET AL., SECOND EDITION, supra note 2, § 1433.
115. See WRIGHT ET AL., THIRD EDITION, supra note 5, § 1702.
116. 6 WRIGHT ET AL., SECOND EDITION, supra note 2, § 1433.
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tor's own words, "for the purposes of defending against the main
claim." As discussed above, in the usual course, the claimant-defen-
dant is not being asked to defend against personal liability. Therefore,
her appearance before the court is limited in a way that almost no
other party's appearance in court is limited. In a sense, the claimant-
defendant, as an individual, has not "appeared" at all-only her claim
has appeared. Such a limited and compelled appearance should not
be construed as a waiver of objection.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected the claim that
Rule 13(g) can confer personal jurisdiction in interpleader actions in
the now forgotten, or consciously ignored,' 17 case of Hagan v. Central
Avenue Dairy, Inc.1 8 In Hagan, the Ninth Circuit determined that Rule
13(g) merely governed "the conduct of actions" and could not be
used to extend jurisdiction over a party." 9 "There is no use in talking
about how an action is to be conducted unless a court has jurisdiction
of the person and competency as to the subject matter."' 20
If Rule 13, as is clear from its face and from the decision of the
Ninth Circuit, cannot confer personal jurisdiction, then reliance by
commentators or courts on Rule 13's liberal interpretation is inappo-
site. Without personal jurisdiction, the court cannot hear the claim
and Rule 13, no matter how broadly read, cannot confer personal
jurisdiction.
Conclusion
Though what has come to be known as pendent personal jurisdic-
tion is likely an appropriate exercise of discretionary power by the
courts, the subsequent enactment of section 1367, the supplemental
jurisdiction statute, does not extend the discretionary power of the
court to ancillary personal jurisdiction. Because the exercise of ancil-
lary personal jurisdiction extends possible personal liability to an indi-
vidual who otherwise could not be subjected to personal liability in
that court, the considerations relevant to the exercise of pendent ju-
risdiction are inapplicable to the exercise of ancillary personal juris-
117. See Rubinbaum LLP, v. Related Corporate Partners V, L.P., 154 F. Supp. 2d 481,
490 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (rejecting an older line of cases on the grounds that they were decided
"prior to the more recent decisions in this circuit and elsewhere confirming the existence
of supplemental personal jurisdiction").
118. 180 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1950).
119. Id. at 503.
120. Id.
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diction. Further, resort to Rule 13 (g), a rule of pleading, not of
jurisdiction, and ofjoinder of claims, not of parties, is unavailing.
The solution, then, is clear. Courts must determine that, absent
independent bases for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
cross-claim defendant, courts may not entertain even transactionally
related cross-claims by claimant-defendants in statutory interpleader
actions. That said, it is clear that the Supreme Court would be empow-
ered to consider the due process rights of the claimant-defendant and
determine that interpleader represented an exception to the usual
rigorous requirements of personal jurisdiction. However, this is not a
determination that should be left to the lower courts. Additionally,
the Supreme Court could confirm the assumed connection between
pendent personal jurisdiction and section 1367 and the policies
therein so as to clearly indicate that pendent and ancillary personal
jurisdiction truly are subsumed in section 1367 and that analysis
should not differ between the two. Congress could also make the same
policy determination and formally approve supplemental personal ju-
risdiction either under section 1367 or a new, separate statute, as it
has with bankruptcy laws. Until that time, however, courts should not
exercise personal jurisdiction over individuals who would not ordina-
rily be amenable to suit before them.
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